Freedom of religion, Articles 25–28

Explanation

Article 25 guarantees every person freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion — this right is expressly subject to public order, morality and health, and to the other provisions of Part III. Pair 1 is correctly matched. Article 26 gives every religious denomination (or any section thereof) the right to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, (b) manage its own affairs in matters of religion, (c) own and acquire movable and immovable property, and (d) administer such property in accordance with law. Critically, Article 26 IS subject to public order, morality and health (see the opening clause: 'Subject to public order, morality and health'). Pair 2 incorrectly states that Article 26 is NOT subject to these grounds — this is a substantive doctrinal error, making pair 2 incorrectly matched. Pair 3 captures a key constitutional distinction: the state (or a statutory body like a Waqf Board acting with state authority) may regulate the secular or administrative aspects of religious institutions, but prescribing the substantive doctrinal or homiletic content of sermons — what an Imam says at Friday prayers — directly touches 'matters of religion' protected under Article 26(b). Courts have consistently held that the line between 'religious' and 'secular' activities is critical: economic, commercial, or purely administrative functions of a religious body can be regulated; the core religious content cannot be dictated by the state. Pair 3 correctly captures this principle. Therefore, only pairs 1 and 3 are correctly matched.

Explanation

Article 25 of the Constitution grants all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality and health, and to other provisions of Part III — so Pair 1 is correctly matched. Article 26 grants every religious denomination (or any section thereof) the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, and administer property — again subject to public order, morality and health — so Pair 2 is correctly matched. Pair 3 is incorrectly matched: the Waqf Act (and its Central counterpart) vests Waqf Boards with authority over the administration, regulation, and development of Waqf properties — that is, the secular or administrative aspects of religious endowments such as maintenance of shrines, mosques, and financial management. It does NOT confer authority on a Waqf Board to prescribe or vet the theological content of Friday sermons. Directing mosque imams to deliver uniform, government-approved sermons would constitute State interference in 'matters of religion' — the core domain protected by Article 26 — and falls outside the legitimate regulatory scope of a statutory Waqf body. The Mirwaiz's constitutional objection that 'the Waqf Board must confine itself to its administrative responsibilities' reflects precisely this distinction between permissible administrative regulation and impermissible State interference in religious practice.

Explanation

Article 25(2)(a) correctly empowers the State to make laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political, or other secular activity that may be associated with religious practice — this is the constitutional peg on which HR&CE (Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments) legislation, including Devaswom board administration, is sustained. Article 26(b) correctly guarantees every religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion — this is the provision trustees typically invoke when they resist state takeover of temple management. However, Article 26(d) is incorrectly described in pair 3: Article 26(d) guarantees the right to acquire and administer movable and immovable property in accordance with law, whereas the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes is guaranteed under Article 26(a). Thus pairs 1 and 2 are correctly matched, but pair 3 is not.

Explanation

Article 26 guarantees every religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and to administer property in accordance with law — this is correctly stated in Pair 1. However, Pair 2 is incorrectly matched: the parens patriae jurisdiction of courts over public temples is not derived from Article 25(2)(a), which is the State's power to throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus, or to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice. Parens patriae, as a doctrine, is an inherent equitable jurisdiction of the superior courts to protect those — including legal persons such as an idol — who cannot protect themselves; it is not a constitutional provision at all, and its source is common-law jurisprudence as adapted in Indian temple law. Pair 3 is correctly stated: under Indian law, a consecrated idol or deity is recognised as a juristic person capable of holding property and suing or being sued, with the shebait (trustee-manager) acting on its behalf in legal proceedings. This is a well-established position in cases such as Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925 PC) and subsequent Indian courts. Thus pairs 1 and 3 are correctly matched while pair 2 misidentifies the constitutional source of the parens patriae doctrine.