Article 370 and J&K statehood

Explanation

Statement 1 is correct. The 103rd Constitutional Amendment (2019) inserted Article 15(6) and Article 16(6), which enable the State to make special provisions — including reservations in aided or unaided private educational institutions and in public posts — for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) of citizens other than those already covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4). The quota is capped at 10% in addition to existing reservations. Statement 2 is incorrect on two counts: the EWS reservation is distinct from, and is in addition to, reservations for OBCs and SCs/STs — it does not merge with OBC reservation. More importantly, the 103rd Amendment does not fix a combined ceiling of 60% for all reservations; the existing judicial ceiling (from Indra Sawhney, 1992) remains at 50% for reservations other than EWS, with the 10% EWS quota being a constitutionally carved-out addition. Statement 3 is correct. J&K, reorganised as a Union Territory in 2019, is governed under the constitutional framework applicable to UTs. The Lieutenant Governor, as the administrator of the UT, is empowered to frame and implement reservation rules — which is precisely how the J&K Reservation Rules, 2005 were amended in September 2019 to incorporate the 10% EWS quota.

Explanation

Statement 1 is correct. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 terminated British paramountcy over the princely states, leaving them legally independent. States could then accede to India or Pakistan by signing an Instrument of Accession. Until they did so, they were technically sovereign entities — which is why both India and Pakistan had to negotiate with rulers like Hari Singh. Statement 2 is incorrect. The Instrument of Accession signed by the princely states — including J&K — was deliberately limited in scope. It covered only three subjects: Defence, External Affairs, and Communications. The acceding state retained its own constitution, internal autonomy, and residuary powers over all other subjects. J&K did NOT cede full or unlimited sovereignty to India through the Instrument; this limited nature of the accession is precisely what gave rise to special provisions for J&K in subsequent constitutional arrangements. Stating that it 'ceded full sovereignty over all subjects' fundamentally mischaracterises the instrument. Statement 3 is correct. A standstill agreement was a separate, transitional arrangement — distinct from accession — whereby a princely state and a Dominion agreed to continue existing administrative, postal, telegraph, and supply links that had previously operated under British India. Pakistan signed such a standstill agreement with J&K; India did not. The standstill agreement carried no political implication of accession; it merely preserved the status quo in practical governance terms while the final question of accession remained open.

Explanation

Statement 1 is correct. India has consistently maintained its sovereign claim over the entire erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, including the portions under Pakistani control. This is reflected in the fact that the J&K Assembly (and later the legislative assembly of the Union Territory) has seats reserved for representatives of Pakistan-occupied territories — a symbolic assertion of India's position — though these seats are kept vacant as elections cannot be held there. Statement 2 is incorrect. The revocation of Article 370 in August 2019, effected through a Presidential Order and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, reorganised the state into two Union Territories (Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh). However, this reorganisation did not in any way extinguish or qualify India's sovereign claim over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India's official position continues to be that PoK is an integral part of India illegally occupied by Pakistan, and this position remained unchanged — and indeed was reaffirmed in Parliamentary debates — following the 2019 revocation.