Preventive provisions of the BNSS, 2023

Explanation

Pair 1 is correctly matched: Section 126 of the BNSS authorises security proceedings against any person who is likely to breach the peace, disturb public tranquility, or commit a wrongful act likely to cause such disturbance — this is the foundational 'peace bond' provision under Chapter IX. Pair 2 is incorrectly matched: Section 163 of the BNSS (the successor to Section 144 CrPC) empowers an Executive Magistrate, SDM, or District Magistrate to issue directions to prevent urgent danger to public peace, health, or safety — and crucially, such orders may be directed at the general public and may be issued ex parte (without hearing the affected party) in emergencies. It is security proceedings (under Sections 126–129), NOT Section 163, that are always initiated against identified persons. Attributing the 'always against identified persons, never ex parte' character to Section 163 inverts the correct distinction. Pair 3 is correctly matched: Articles 19(2) and 19(3) of the Constitution permit Parliament (and in the case of 19(3), the State) to impose reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)) and on the right to assemble peacefully (Article 19(1)(b)) respectively, on specified grounds that include public order. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (1970) upheld preventive bond provisions as valid reasonable restrictions under this framework.

Explanation

Statement 1 is correct. Section 163 of the BNSS (successor to Section 144 CrPC) confers on an Executive Magistrate the power to issue orders directing persons to abstain from a certain act or to take certain precautionary measures when there is sufficient ground to apprehend danger or injury to any person, disturbance of public tranquillity, riot, or affray. The foundational requirement is a reasonable apprehension of a threat to public order or tranquillity — the power is preventive, not punitive, and must be exercised proportionately. A blanket prohibitory order issued not because peaceful lawful activity poses any threat to peace, but merely because elections are imminent or because authorities are suspicious of the motivations of the persons involved, exceeds this power and infringes the fundamental freedoms of speech, expression, and peaceful assembly guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has consistently held that restrictions on these freedoms must satisfy the test of reasonableness under Articles 19(2) and 19(3), and a preventive order under Section 144 CrPC / Section 163 BNSS that lacks a factual foundation of apprehended breach of peace fails that test. Statement 2 is incorrect on two grounds. First, an order under Section 163 BNSS is an executive/administrative order passed by a Magistrate, not a decree or order of a civil court — it does not operate as a court injunction. Second, the primary remedy against such an order is NOT restricted to an appellate route to the High Court; a person aggrieved by such a prohibitory order may challenge it by moving the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (writ jurisdiction) or the Supreme Court under Article 32, particularly when fundamental rights under Article 19 are alleged to be violated. The power to challenge via writ has been firmly established in Indian constitutional jurisprudence and cannot be displaced by any statutory appellate framework.