Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000 · GS-II
India may end social media’s legal shield: What happens to Meta, Instagram, X? ↗
Consider the following pairs regarding the intermediary liability framework under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and related judicial/constitutional developments:
- Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 — Provides conditional immunity to intermediaries from liability for third-party content, subject to due-diligence compliance
- Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) — Read down Section 79(3)(b) to require a court order or lawful government direction before a platform is obliged to remove content
- Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 — Upheld by the Supreme Court as a valid restriction on online speech, subject to procedural safeguards
Which of the pairs given above is/are correctly matched?
Explanation
Pair 1 is correctly matched: Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 is the statutory 'safe harbour' provision that grants conditional immunity to internet intermediaries — including social media platforms — from liability for content generated or transmitted by third parties, provided the intermediary meets prescribed due-diligence conditions and does not initiate, select recipients of, or modify the transmitted information. Pair 2 is correctly matched: In the landmark Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court 'read down' Section 79(3)(b), which had required intermediaries to remove content upon receiving 'actual knowledge' — a phrase the government interpreted broadly to include private complaints. The Court held this was constitutionally untenable, as it could chill free speech. It clarified that the takedown obligation under Section 79(3)(b) is triggered only by a court order or a government direction that itself satisfies the requirements of Article 19(2) — not by a private notice or complaint alone. Pair 3 is incorrectly matched: Section 66A — which criminalised sending 'grossly offensive' or 'menacing' messages online — was struck down in its entirety in Shreya Singhal (2015) as unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression). It was not upheld with safeguards; it was invalidated. This is a critical distinction — the same judgment that read down Section 79(3)(b) also annulled Section 66A completely, on the ground that the offences it defined were vague and overbroad beyond the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2).